Battle of the Sakarya

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Battle of the Sakarya
Part of the Greco-Turkish War (1919–22) of the Turkish War of Independence

At Duatepe observation hill (in Polatlı): Fevzi Çakmak, Kâzım Özalp, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, İsmet İnönü and Hayrullah Fişek
DateAugust 23 – September 13, 1921
Location
On the banks of Sakarya River, Turkey
Result

Turkish victory

  • Greek advance halted
Belligerents
Kingdom of Greece Greece Ottoman Empire Ankara Government
Commanders and leaders
Constantine I
Anastasios Papoulas
Prince Andrew		 Mustafa Kemal Pasha
Fevzi Pasha
İsmet Pasha
Units involved
Order of battle Order of battle
Strength
120,000 soldiers
3,780 officers
57,000 rifles
2,768 machine guns
386 cannons
1,350 swords
600 3-ton trucks
240 1-ton trucks
18 airplanes[1]		 96,326 soldiers
5,401 officers
54,572 rifles
825 machine guns
196 cannons
1,309 swords
2 aircraft [1]
Casualties and losses
From August 23 to September 16:[2]
4,000 dead
19,000 wounded
354 missing
Total: 22,900		 3,700 dead
18,480 wounded
108 captives
5,639 deserters
8,089 missing
Total: 38,029[3][Note 1]

The Battle of the Sakarya (Turkish: Sakarya Meydan Muharebesi, lit. 'Sakarya Field Battle'), also known as the Battle of the Sangarios (Greek: Μάχη του Σαγγαρίου, romanized: Máchi tou Sangaríou), was an important engagement in the Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922).

The battle went on for 21 days from August 23 to September 13, 1921, close to the banks of the Sakarya River in the immediate vicinity of Polatlı, which is today a district of the Ankara Province.[5] The battle line stretched over 62 miles (100 km).[6]

It is also known as the Officers' Battle[7] (Turkish: Subaylar Savaşı) in Turkey because of the unusually high casualty rate (70–80%) among the officers.[8] Later, it was also called Melhâme-i Kübrâ (Islamic equivalent to Armageddon) by Kemal Atatürk.[9]

The Battle of the Sakarya is considered as the turning point of the Turkish War of Independence.[10][11][12][13][14][15][16] The Turkish observer, writer, and literary critic İsmail Habip Sevük later described the importance of the battle with these words:

The retreat that started in Vienna on 13 September 1683 stopped 238 years later.[17]

Background[edit]

The Greek offensive, under King Constantine I as Supreme Commander of the Greek Forces in Asia, was committed on July 16, 1921, and skilfully executed. A feint towards the Turkish right flank at Eskişehir distracted Ismet Pasha just as the major assault fell on the left at Kara Hisar. The Greeks then wheeled their axis to the north, swept towards Eskişehir and rolled up the Turkish defence in a series of frontal assaults that was combined with flanking movements.[18]

Eskişehir fell on July 17 despite a vigorous counterattack by Ismet Pasha, who was determined to fight to the finish. The saner counsels of Mustafa Kemal prevailed, however, and Ismet disengaged with great losses to reach the comparative safety of the Sakarya River, some 30 mi (48 km) to the north and only 50 miles (80 km) from Ankara.[18]

The battle took place along the Sakarya River, around the vicinity of Polatlı, and had a battle line 100 km (62 mi) long.

The determining feature of the terrain was the river itself, which flows eastward across the plateau, suddenly curves north and then turns back westwards. The great loop described forms a natural barrier. The river banks are awkward and steep, and bridges were few with only two on the frontal section of the loop. East of the loop, the landscape rises before an invader in rocky, barren ridges and hills towards Ankara. It was in those hills, east of the river that the Turks dug in their defensive positions. The front followed the hills east of the Sakarya River from a point near Polatlı southwards to the place at which the Gök River joins the Sakarya, and then swung at rightangles eastwards following the line of the Gök River. That was an excellent defensive ground.[19]

For the Greeks, the question on whether to dig in and rest on their previous gains or to advance towards Ankara in great effort and destroy the Army of the Grand National Assembly. That was difficult to resolve and posed the eternal problems with which the Greek staff had to deal since the beginning of the war. The dangers of extending the lines of communications still further in such an inhospitable terrain that killed horses, caused vehicles to break down and prevented the movement of heavy artillery were obvious. The present front that gave the Greeks the control of the essential strategic railway was tactically most favourable, but the Army of the Grand National Assembly had escaped encirclement at Kütahya and so nothing had been settled. That made the temptation of achieving a knockout blow irresistible.[20]

Battle[edit]

The Greek 9th infantry division marches through the steppe.
Turkish prisoners-of-war were captured during the battle.

On August 10, Greek King Constantine I finally committed his forces to an assault against the Sakarya Line. The Greeks marched hard for nine days before they made contact with the enemy. The march included an outflanking manoeuvre through the northern part of Anatolia through the Salt Desert, where food and water scarcely existed and so the advancing Greek infantry attacked the poor Turkish villages for maize and water or meat from the flocks that were pastured on the fringe of the desert.[21]

On August 23, battle was finally joined by the Greeks making contact with the advanced Turkish positions south of the Gök River. The Turkish General Staff had made its headquarters at Polatlı, on the railway a few miles east of the coast of the Sakarya River, and its troops were prepared to resist.

On August 26, the Greeks attacked all along the line. Crossing the shallow Gök, the infantry fought its way step up onto the heights, where every ridge and hill top had to be stormed against strong entrenchments and withering fire.

By September 2, the commanding heights of the key Mount Chal were in Greek hands, but once the enveloping movement against the Turkish left flank had failed, the battle descended to a typical head-on confrontation of infantry, machine guns and artillery.[22] The Greeks launched their main effort in the centre and pushed forward some 10 mi (16 km) in 10 days through the Turks' second line of defence. Some Greek units came as close as 31 mi (50 km) to the city of Ankara.[23] That was the peak of their achievement in the Asia Minor Campaign.[21]

For days during the battle, neither ammunition nor food had reached the front because of the successful harassment of the Greek lines of communications and the raids behind the Greek lines by Turkish cavalry. All of the Greek troops were committed to the battle, but fresh Turkish draftees were still arriving throughout the campaign in response to the Turkish National Movement's mobilisation. All of those causes ended the impetus of the Greek attack. For a few days, there was a lull in the fighting during which neither of the exhausted armies could press an attack.[24] Constantine, who commanded the battle personally, was almost taken prisoner by a Turkish patrol.[25]

Astute as ever at the decisive moment, Mustafa Kemal assumed personal command and led a small counterattack against the Greek left, around Mount Chal, on September 8. The Greek line held, and the attack itself achieved a limited military success,[26] but fear that presaged a major Turkish effort to outflank their forces while the severity of the winter was approaching made Constantine break off the Greek assault on September 14, 1921.[27]

That made Anastasios Papoulas order a general retreat toward Eskişehir and Afyonkarahisar. The Greek troops evacuated Mount Chal, which had been taken at such a cost, and they retired unmolested across the Sakarya River to the positions that they had left a month earlier and took their guns and equipment with them. In the line of the retreating army, nothing was left that could benefit the Turks. Railways and bridges were blown up, and villages were burnt in the scorched-earth policy.[28]

After the Greek retreat, the Turkish forces managed to retake Sivrihisar on September 20, Aziziye on September 22 and Bolvadin and Çay on September 24.

Aftermath[edit]

Map of Greek and Turkish offensives.

The retreat from Sakarya marked the end of the Greeks' hopes to impose a settlement on Turkey by the force of arms. In May 1922, Papoulas and his complete staff resigned and was replaced by General Georgios Hatzianestis, who proved much more inept than his predecessor.[22]

On the other hand, Mustafa Kemal returned to Ankara, where the Grand National Assembly awarded him the rank of Field Marshal of the Army and the title of Gazi to render its honours as the saviour of the Turkish nation.[29]

According to the speech that was delivered years later before the same National Assembly at the Second General Conference of the Republican People's Party, which took part from October 15 to 20, 1927, Kemal was said to have ordered that "not an inch of the country should be abandoned until it was drenched with the blood of the citizens" once he realised that the Turkish Army was losing ground rapidly and that virtually no natural defences were left between the battle line and Ankara.[30][31]

Lord Curzon argued that the military situation became a stalemate with time tending favour the Turks. Their reputation by the British was improving. In his opinion, the Turkish nationalists were more than ready to negotiate.[32]

The Ankara government then signed the Treaty of Kars with the Russians and the most important Treaty of Ankara with the French, which reduced the Turkish army's front notably in the Cilician theatre and allowed it to concentrate against the Greeks to the west.[33]

For the Turkish troops, the battle was the turning point of the war, which would develop in a series of important military clashes against the Greeks and drive the invaders out of Asia Minor during the Turkish War of Independence.[34] The Greeks could do nothing but fight to secure their retreat. Next year, on August 26, the Turkish offensive started with Battle of Dumlupınar. Kemal dispatched his army on a drive to the coast of the Aegean Sea to pursue the Greek Army. That would culminate in the direct assault of Smyrna from September 9 to 11, 1922.

The war ended by the withdrawal of the Greeks from Asia Minor, as would be formalised by the Treaty of Lausanne, on 24 July 1923.

Gallery[edit]

  • Evacuation of wounded Greek soldiers
    Evacuation of wounded Greek soldiers
  • Collection of Turkish prisoners
    Collection of Turkish prisoners
  • Greek infantry awaits order to attack
    Greek infantry awaits order to attack
  • Greek infantry approaches the heights of Polatlı
    Greek infantry approaches the heights of Polatlı
  • Evzones attack
    Evzones attack
  • Bodies of killed Greek soldiers after the Battle of the Sakarya
    Bodies of killed Greek soldiers after the Battle of the Sakarya
  • Greek lithograph of the era, depicting the battle as a Greek victory
    Greek lithograph of the era, depicting the battle as a Greek victory
  • Mustafa Kemal and Salih (Bozok) at Duatepe Hill, observing enemy positions
    Mustafa Kemal and Salih (Bozok) at Duatepe Hill, observing enemy positions
  • "Anatolia's present to Greece on the occasion of the new year". Political cartoon published one month after the battle
    "Anatolia's present to Greece on the occasion of the new year". Political cartoon published one month after the battle

See also[edit]

Notes[edit]

  1. ^ Although Turkish casualties state 5,639 deserters and 8,089 missing, these two casualty figures belong to the period between the Battle of Kütahya–Eskişehir and the Battle of Sakarya.[4]

References[edit]

  1. ^ a b Battle of Sakarya Archived June 27, 2009, at the Wayback Machine, Turkish General Staff, retrieved: 12 Ağustos 2009.
  2. ^ Σαγγάριος 1921, Η επική μάχη που σφράγησε την τύχη του Μικρασιατικού Ελληνισμού, Εκδόσεις Περισκόπιο, Ιούλιος 2008, ISBN 978-960-6740-45-9, page 32
  3. ^ Zeki Sarıhan: Kurtuluş Savaşı günlüğü: açıklamalı kronoloji. Sakarya savaşı'ndan Lozan'ın açılışına (23 Ağustos 1921-20 Kasım 1922) (engl.: Diary of the War of Independence: commented chronology. From the Battle of Sakarya to the opening of Lausanne (23 August 1921-20 November 1922)), Türk Tarih Kurumu yayınları (publishing house), 1996, ISBN 975-16-0517-2, page 62.
  4. ^ Celâl Erikan: 100 [i.e. Yüz] soruda Kurtuluş Savaşımızın tarihi, Edition I, Gerçek Yayınevi, 1971, İstanbul, page 166. (in Turkish)
  5. ^ Campbell, Verity; Carillet, Jean-Bernard; Elridge, Dan; Gordon, Frances Linzee (2007). Turkey. Lonely Planet. ISBN 978-1-74104-556-7.
  6. ^ Edmund Schopen: Die neue Türkei, Wilhelm Goldmann Verlag, 1938, page 95. (in German)
  7. ^ Sean McMeekin, The Berlin-Baghdad Express: The Ottoman Empire and Germany's Bid for World Power , Harvard University Press, 2010, ISBN 978-0-674-05739-5, p. 302.
  8. ^ Osman Faruk Loğoğlu, İsmet İnönü and the Making of Modern Turkey, İnönü Vakfı, 1997, ISBN 978-975-7951-01-8, p. 56.
  9. ^ [1] Archived 2019-02-04 at the Wayback Machine Sakarya Meydan Muharebesi’nin Yankıları (Melhâme-i Kübrâ Büyük Kan Seli veya büyük Savaş Alanı)
  10. ^ Revue internationale d'histoire militaire Volumes 46–48, International Committee of Historical Sciences. Commission of comparative military history, 1980, page 222
  11. ^ International review of military history (Volume 50), International Committee of Historical Sciences. Commission d'histoire militaire comparée, 1981, page 25.
  12. ^ Dominic Whiting, Turkey Handbook, Footprint Travel Guides, 2000, ISBN 1-900949-85-7, page 445.
  13. ^ Young Turk, Moris Farhi, Arcade Publishing, 2005, ISBN 978-1-55970-764-0, page 153.
  14. ^ Kevin Fewster, Vecihi Başarin, Hatice Hürmüz Başarin, A Turkish view of Gallipoli: Çanakkale, Hodja, 1985, ISBN 0-949575-38-0, page 118.
  15. ^ William M. Hale Turkish foreign policy, 1774–2000, Routledge, 2000, ISBN 0-7146-5071-4, page 52.
  16. ^ Michael Dumper, Bruce E. Stanley: Cities of the Middle East and North Africa: a historical encyclopedia, ABC-CLIO, 2007, ISBN 1-57607-919-8, page 38.
  17. ^ Kate Fleet, Suraiya Faroqhi, Reşat Kasaba: The Cambridge History of Turkey (Volume 4), Cambridge University Press, 2008, ISBN 0-521-62096-1, page 138.
  18. ^ a b Christopher Chant "Warfare of the 20th. Century – Armed Conflicts Outside the Two World Wars" Chartwell Books Inc. New Jersey 1988. ISBN 1-55521-233-6, p. 22
  19. ^ Michael Llewellyn Smith, p. 227
  20. ^ Michael Llewellyn Smith, p. 228
  21. ^ a b Michael Llewellyn Smith, p. 233
  22. ^ a b Christopher Chant "Warfare of the 20th. Century – Armed Conflicts Outside the Two World Wars" Chartwell Books Inc. New Jersey 1988. ISBN 1-55521-233-6, p. 23
  23. ^ Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift, Verlag C. Ueberreuter, 1976, page 131. (in German)
  24. ^ Michael Llewellyn Smith, p. 233–234
  25. ^ Johannes Glasneck: Kemal Atatürk und die moderne Türkei, 2010, Ahriman-Verlag GmbH, ISBN 3894846089, page 133. (in German)
  26. ^ Michael Llewellyn Smith "Ionian Vision" Hurst & Company London 1973 ISBN 1-85065-413-1, pg. 233–234
  27. ^ Christopher Chant, p. 23
  28. ^ Michael Llewellyn Smith, p. 234
  29. ^ Shaw, Stanford Jay (1976), "History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey", Cambridge University Press, ISBN 978-0-521-21280-9, p. 357
  30. ^ Turkish: Dedim ki: «Hatt-ı müdafaa yoktur, Saht-ı müdafaa vardır. O satıh, bütün vatandır. Vatanın, her karış toprağı, vatandaşın kaniyle ıslanmadıkça, terkonuamaz. Onun için küçük, büyük her cüz-i tam, bulunduğu mevziden atılabilir. Fakat küçük, büyük her cüz-i tam, ilk durabildiği noktada, tekrar düşmana karşı cephe teşkil edip muharebeye devam eder. Yanındaki cüz-, tamın çekilmeğe mecbur olduğunu gören cüz-i tamlar, ona tâbi olamaz. Bulunduğu mevzide nihayete kadar sebat ve mukavemet mecburdur.», Gazi M. Kemal, Nutuk-Söylev, Cilt II: 1920–1927, Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, ISBN 975-16-0195-9, pp. 826–827.
  31. ^ English: "I said that there was no line of defence but a plain of defence, and that this plain was the whole of the country. Not an inch of the country should be abandoned until it was drenched with the blood of the citizens...". A speech Delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, 1927, Ministry of Education Print. Plant, 1963, p. 521.
  32. ^ Michael Llewellyn Smith, p. 240
  33. ^ Michael Llewellyn Smith, p. 241
  34. ^ Shaw, Stanford Jay; , p. 362

Bibliography[edit]

  • Smith, Michael Llewellyn (1973), Ionian Vision – Greece in Asia Minor 1919–1922, Hurst & Company London, ISBN 1-85065-413-1
  • Chant, Christopher (1988), Warfare of the 20th. Century – Armed Conflicts Outside the Two World Wars, Chartwell Books Inc. New Jersey, ISBN 1-85065-413-1

See also[edit]

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