Israel–Taiwan relations

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Israeli–Taiwanese relations
Map indicating locations of Israel and Taiwan

Israel
Taiwan
Diplomatic mission
Israel Economic and Cultural Office in TaipeiTaipei Economic and Cultural Office in Tel Aviv

Israel–Taiwan relations describe the relations between the State of Israel and the Republic of China (Taiwan), which are not official in light of Taiwan's international status, although the two countries have economic and commercial relations, and Israel has an Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei since 1993. The unofficial relations between the two countries are mainly expressed in the fields of science, trade and industry.[1]

History[edit]

See also: China–Israel relations

The government of Nationalist China has always been sympathetic and supportive of Zionism.[2] In 1947, China abstained in the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine and officially recognized Israel in March 1949 but later voted in the United Nations General Assembly to accept Israel as a member state, allowing Israel to send a consul to China. The consul was stationed in Shanghai to deal with the transfer of Jewish refugees to Israel. However, when the Nationalist government moved to Taiwan, a former Qing province and later Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945, due to the Chinese Civil War, Israel's consul in Shanghai Walter Eytan stated: “According to our country's recognition policy, our recognition must be based on a pragmatic basis... There is no doubt that the government of the Republic is an effective government that controls the Mainland China." This idea established the general direction of Israel's China policy.

On 9 January 1950, Israel officially recognized the newly established People's Republic of China, becoming the first country in the Middle East to do so.[2] By then, the People's Republic of China had taken over the entire country. As a result, all existing ties between Israel and Taiwan were severed. Taiwan even refused to grant visas to Israelis.[3]

In 1959, Israel instructed the country's ambassador to the United Nations, “Although our exchanges with Communist China are not smooth, we must try to avoid contact with the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan.”[4] However, China did not establish diplomatic relations with Israel. During the Cold War, based on the line of opposing imperialism and export of revolution, the Chinese Communist Party supported Arab countries against Israel and maintained hostile relations with its government. It was not until 1992 that China and Israel established diplomatic relations. But even so, Israel has not established diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Based on the fact that both countries are allies of the United States, the United States has always provided military and economic support to the two countries.

On 25 October 1971, Israel voted against the Republic of China's continued stay in the United Nations, that is, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758. In the early 1980s, Israel had diplomatic relations with only seven of the twenty-eight Asian countries. The countries that did not have any relations with Israel were Muslim or communist countries to which Taiwan was added. On 24 January 1992, Israel and China established diplomatic relations. The government of Taiwan expressed its concern and stated that “Any matter concerning my country's sovereignty and rights mentioned in the Communiqué on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between the State of Israel and the People's Republic of China will not be recognized. With regard to the future relations between China and Israel, our side will consider carefully based on national interests before making a decision."[5]

On 29 March 1993, the "Taipei Economic and Trade Office" opened in Tel Aviv, and on 18 July 1993, Israel opened the "Israel Economic and Trade Office" in Taipei, thus receiving trade relations between the two countries.[6][7][8] On 11 September 1995, the representative offices of the two parties were renamed "Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Tel Aviv" and "Israel Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei".[9]

In March 2002, the second Taiwan, United States, and Israel Trilateral National Defense and Security Seminar was held in Israel, inviting tripartite scholars to discuss issues of common concern such as diplomacy, national defense, and strategy, and establish a second-track dialogue.[10]

Economic relations[edit]

In 1997, the bilateral trade volume between Taiwan and Israel was twice the trade volume between China and Israel.[2]

In 2020, Israel is the 29th largest trading partner, 29th largest import partner, and 29th largest export partner of Taiwan.[citation needed] The value of exports to Israel was US$842.825,815, an annual increase of 7.706%.[citation needed] Imports from Israel amounted to 1.069.7 million US$2,546, an annual increase of 7.787%.[citation needed] In 2020, Taiwan was ranked 5th in the list of the largest outlets for Israeli goods in Asia, totaling 2.5 billion shekels.[11]

The total amount of investment by Taiwan in Israel is about 280 million U.S. dollars. The investment of Taiwanese companies is mainly through equity investment, with relatively little involvement in actual operations. In addition to purchasing diamonds from Taiwanese businesspeople coming to Israel, high tech industries are also major cooperation projects.[12]

Military ties[edit]

The military cooperation between Israel's aerospace industry and Taiwan can be traced back to the Republic of China's withdrawal from the United Nations in 1971. Taiwan's military pursued the self-reliance of weapons and decentralized procurement sources. During this period, Israel vigorously expanded its military, hoping to share the cost of weapon research and development through export sales of military products. However, considering the relationship between Taiwan and Arab countries, everything is done under confidentiality.[13]

In 1975, when the United States refused to sell Sidewinder missiles to Taiwan under pressure from China, Israel sold anti-aircraft missiles and licensed the production of Gabriel II anti-ship missiles. The Taiwanese military was renamed Hsiung Feng I, which was later developed into a series of missiles. This is the first arms deal between the two sides. By 1989, a total of 523 missiles and 77 launchers had been produced. The remaining licensed production includes 50 Dvora speedboats, as well as a large number of firearms and mortars, including 127 mm Python rocket launchers, IMI Galil rifles, Uzi mini submachine guns, and various other electronic equipment and weapons.[14]

Since then, arms sales by both sides have risen rapidly, both in quantity and in quality. Taiwan's AIDC F-CK-1 Ching-kuo fighter jets and 300 F-5 fighter jets were all upgraded from Israel, equipped with Israeli-licensed radars produced in Taiwan and Taiwanese Navy's Yang class destroyers was equipped with Gabriel anti-ship missiles and Israel's aerospace industry. The Reshet fire control and command system was sold, and other companies refurbished 13 old warships. In addition, the underground aircraft shelter system, weapons and fuel storage systems are believed to have adopted the Israeli model.[15]

The British Jane's Information Group in the 1980s speculated that the Qingfeng missile development process received a lot of technical support from Israel. In 2001, the National Zhongshan Academy of Sciences also stated in its internal publication that the Qingfeng missile had assistance from Israel. The missile entered service in October 1991.

After China purchased Russia’s Kilo-class submarine, in order to maintain the balance of the Taiwan Strait, Taiwanese military sought to purchase new conventional submarines. Because the United States focuses on the development of Nuclear submarine and no longer produces conventional submarines, it once again set its sights on Israel. Taking into account the response of China, the United States came forward to coordinate and formulated the method of Israeli design, German production, and American purchase and delivery.[16] Israel's Dolphin-class submarine has been a goal of the military for many years. For this reason, Antonio Chiang, who was the deputy secretary-general of National Security Council of Taiwan, and advisory committee member Ke Chengheng, have visited the United States and Israel.[17]

On 10 September 2001, the United Daily News disclosed that Taiwanese military had a "major breakthrough" in monitoring to China. The two sides reached a secret agreement to officially lease Israel's Earth Remote Observation System-A (EROS A). Commercial spy satellites, as well as three other satellites of the same type that are about to be launched, have carried out dynamic reconnaissance and search on the facilities and troops of the Chinese People's Liberation Army over a period of six years. Relying on this satellite, the detection targets will penetrate deep into the interior of China, and the detection targets include all "missile launch bases that pose a threat to Taiwan." According to the intelligence provided by the satellite, it can provide accurate information for the military "raid" mainland China. In this transaction, Israel's profit will be as high as 2 billion US dollars.[18][19][20] In addition, the two sides are also cooperating on a highly confidential "Tiangui" (天貴) project, which aims to improve the military's ability to locate radars and radio monitors.

References[edit]

  1. ^ Roie Yellinek (12 March 2020). "Taiwan and Israel: Don't Recognize, but Collaborate". Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies. Retrieved 8 May 2020.
  2. ^ a b c Jonathan Goldstein (2003). The Republic of China and Israel, 1911-2003. Frank Cass.
  3. ^ "טאיוואן הפסיקה לתת אשרות כניסה לישראלים" [Taiwan has stopped issuing entry visas to Israelis]. Maariv. 4 August 1976. Retrieved 25 May 2021.
  4. ^ E. Zev Sufott (2000). "Israel's China Policy 1950-1992". Israel Affairs. 7 (1).
  5. ^ 公眾外交協調會 (24 January 1992). "對於以色列與中共於八十一年元月廿四日正式建立外交關係事". 中華民國外交部. Archived from the original on 9 February 2019. Retrieved 7 February 2019.
  6. ^ "代表處簡介". 中華民國駐外單位聯合網站. Archived from the original on 2016-10-19. Retrieved 2016-10-19.
  7. ^ "駐臺外國機構". 中華民國外交部.
  8. ^ Moshe Yegar (2004). המסע הארוך לאסיה: פרק בתולדות הדיפלומטיה של ישראל [The Long Journey to Asia: A Chapter in the History of Israeli Diplomacy]. Haifa University Press. p. 287-292.
  9. ^ "駐外館處". 中華民國外交部. Archived from the original on 15 January 2021. Retrieved 13 January 2021.
  10. ^ "《中華民國91年外交年鑑》〈第三章 中外關係〉". 中華民國外交部. Archived from the original on 13 July 2018. Retrieved 19 May 2018.
  11. ^ "Внешняя торговля Израиля в 2020 году: основной рынок сбыта товаров – ЕС, основной поставщик – Китай" [Foreign Trade Israel in 2020: the main market for goods is the EU, the main supplier is China]. NEWSru.co.il. 21 January 2021. Retrieved 27 March 2021.
  12. ^ "投資環境簡介" (PDF). 經濟部全球臺商服務網. Archived (PDF) from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 3 August 2015.
  13. ^ 文現深 (March 1990). "以臺秘密軍事合作". 遠見雜誌. Archived from the original on 24 September 2015. Retrieved 30 July 2015.
  14. ^ Yitzhak Shichor (1998). "Israel's military transfers to China and Taiwan". Survival. 40 (1).
  15. ^ Robert Karniol (1990). Chung-Shan: Taiwan's Military Research Institute. Vol. 23. International Defense Review.
  16. ^ 高路, 李雨桐 (10 March 2006). "出售部分尖端武器售臺灣，美默許以色列對臺軍售". 人民網. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 31 July 2015.
  17. ^ 丘冰 (7 September 2005). "臺灣'軍事外交'全面出擊". 《世界報》.
  18. ^ "Taiwan "Borrows" Israeli Satellite During Overpasses". SpaceDaily. 12 August 2001.
  19. ^ 李淩 (16 August 2001). "解放軍模擬攻澎湖". 世界新闻报.
  20. ^ 宗樹 (11 September 2001). "臺灣發展間諜衛星". 中國國防報.
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