User:Rami R/Sandbox

This is a working draft of a summarized 2006 Lebanon war#Reviews of the conflict and a new sub-article "Reviews of the 2006 Lebanon war".

Aftermath

George W. Bush declared that Hezbollah lost the war and that "There's going to be a new power in the south of Lebanon"

Following the UN-brokered ceasefire, there were mixed responses on who had gained most in the war. Iran and Syria proclaimed a victory for Hezbollah while the Israeli and United States administrations declared that Hezbollah lost the conflict. Initially, in a poll by an Israeli radio station, Israelis were split on the outcome with the majority believing that no one won. By 25 August, 63% of Israelis polled wanted Olmert to resign due to his handling of the war.

Israeli Prime Minister Olmert admitted to the Knesset that there were mistakes in the war in Lebanon, though he framed UN Security Council resolution 1701 as an accomplishment for Israel that would bring home the seized soldiers, and said that the operations had altered the regional strategic balance vis-à-vis Hezbollah.

U.S. President George W. Bush questioned Hezbollah's declarations of victory "when at one time [they] were a state within a state, safe within southern Lebanon, and now [they're] going to be replaced by a Lebanese army and an international force." UNIFIL has been given an expanded mandate, including the ability to use force to ensure that their area of operations is not used for hostile activities, and to resist attempts by force to prevent them from discharging their duties. However by April 2007, the Bush administration had re-characterized Israel’s experience in the war. They described the Summer War as a “strategic defeat” that failed to meet military goals, heaped widespread condemnation upon it, and punctured the “myth of the invincibility of the Israeli army”.

The Economist concluded that by surviving this asymmetrical military conflict with Israel, Hezbollah effectively emerged with a military and political victory from this conflict. They cite the facts that Hezbollah was able to sustain defenses on Lebanese soil and inflict unmitigated rocket attacks on Israeli civilians in the face of a punishing air and land campaign by the IDF. Also, Israel's stated goals entering the conflict were to retrieve its two seized soldiers and destroy the military capability of Hezbollah - neither goal was accomplished. However, given the response from Israeli military forces, which caused widespread destruction in southern Lebanon, as well as a new UN force to occupy what was formerly a Hezbollah controlled area, the conflict is generally seen as weakening Hezbollah militarily.[1][2][3]

A sign erected after the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war in South Lebanon which displays rockets and Hezbollah Chief Nasrallah

Khairi Abaza wrote in the Lebanese English-language daily Daily Star: "The same strategic manipulation of public opinion can be seen in Hizbullah's 'victory' against Israel in summer 2006. But what was this victory? A victory that left around 1,200 Lebanese dead, led to billions of dollars in damages and losses in tourism income, and the entry of United Nations troops in Southern Lebanon? With such a balance sheet, how could Hizbullah and its Arab supporters mislead the Arab public and claim victory?... Yes, the party's secretary general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, was left standing... but is that enough when their nations and people were left battered?"

On 27 August, Hassan Nasrallah apologised to the Lebanese people for the incident that sparked the war, saying "Had we known that the capture of the soldiers would have led to this, we would definitely not have done it." This was the day before UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's visit to Lebanon, On 22 September, some eight hundred thousand Hezbollah supporters gathered in Beirut for a victory rally. Nasrallah said that Hezbollah should celebrate the "divine and strategic victory".

On 21 August, a group of demobilized Israel reserve soldiers and parents of soldiers killed in the fighting started a movement calling for the resignation of Ehud Olmert and the establishment of a state commission of inquiry. By 25 August they grew to over 2,000 supporters , including the influential Movement for Quality Government. On 28 August, Olmert announced that there would be no independent state or governmental commission of inquiry, but two internal inspection probes, one to investigate the political echelon and one to examine IDF, and likely a third commission to examine the Home Front, to be announced at a later date. These would have a more limited mandate and less authority than a single inquiry commission headed by a retired judge. The political and military committees were to be headed by former director of Mossad Nahum Admoni and former Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, respectively. Critics argued that these committees amount to a whitewash, due to their limited authority, limited investigatory scope, their self-appointed basis, and that neither would be headed by a retired judge. Due to these pressures, on 11 October, Admoni was replaced by retired justice Eliyahu Winograd as chair of the political probe, and the probe itself was elevated to the status of governmental commission with near-state commission mandate: the Winograd Commission.

Israeli chief of staff Dan Halutz admitted to failings in the conflict. On 15 August, Israeli government and defense officials called for Halutz' resignation following a stock scandal in which he admitted selling stocks hours before the start of the Israeli offensive. Disclosing his intent to shortly resign, Ilan Harari, the IDF's chief education officer, stated at a conference of senior IDF officers that Israel lost the war, becoming the first senior active duty officer to publicly state such an opinion. IDF Major General Yiftah Ron-Tal, on 4 October 2006 became the second and highest ranking serving officer to express his opinion that the IDF failed "to win the day in the battle against Hezbollah," as well as calling for Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz' resignation. Ron-Tal was subsequently fired for making those and other critical comments. Halutz eventually resigned on 17 January, 2007.[4]

Hezbollah was quick to use the findings of the report to bolster its claims of victory over the vastly superior Israeli military and to criticize the Lebanese government's handling of the conflict.

In March 2007, the Israeli Ministerial Committee for Symbols and Ceremonies decided that the conflict would be defined as a war, following pressure from bereaved families. Two days later, the Committee decided to name the war "The Second Lebanon War", a decision that was subsequently approved by the Israeli cabinet.

In Syria the war has led to a more belligerent policy towards Israel. In late 2006 President Bashar al-Assad threatened to strike Israel if it did not withdraw from the Golan, saying "even your atomic bomb will not protect you."

The fighting resulted in a huge financial setback for Lebanon, with estimates ranging from US$7 to US$15 billion in direct costs while the cost for Israel is put at US$1.6 - US$3 billion. This has prompted a commentator in the London-based Arabic newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat to question the claims of victory by Hezbollah. According to one analyst in the Associated Press, the main casualty was the fragile unity between Lebanon's sectarian and political groups, though an Asia Times piece points to Free Patriotic Movement head Michel Aoun's support for Hezbollah and provision of housing for displaced Shi'a as evidence for strengthened relations.

Lebanese desire to emigrate has increased since the war. Over a fifth of Shias, a quarter of Sunnis, and nearly half of Maronites have expressed the desire to leave Lebanon. Nearly a third of such Maronites have already submitted visa applications to foreign embassies, and another 60,000 Christians have already fled, as of April 2007. Lebanese Christians are concerned that their influence is waning, fear the apparent rise of radical Islam, and worry of potential Sunni-Shia rivalry.

Reviews of the 2006 Lebanon war

George W. Bush declared that Hezbollah lost the war and that "There's going to be a new power in the south of Lebanon"

Following the UN-brokered ceasefire, there were mixed responses on who had gained most in the war. Iran and Syria proclaimed a victory for Hezbollah while the Israeli and United States administrations declared that Hezbollah lost the conflict. Initially, in a poll by an Israeli radio station, Israelis were split on the outcome with the majority believing that no one won. By 25 August, 63% of Israelis polled wanted Olmert to resign due to his handling of the war.

British military historian John Keegan concluded that the outcome of the war was "misreported as an Israeli defeated" due to anti-Israel bias in the international media.

The Economist concluded that by surviving this asymmetrical military conflict with Israel, Hezbollah effectively emerged with a military and political victory from this conflict. They cite the facts that Hezbollah was able to sustain defenses on Lebanese soil and inflict unmitigated rocket attacks on Israeli civilians in the face of a punishing air and land campaign by the IDF. Also, Israel's stated goals entering the conflict were to retrieve its two seized soldiers and destroy the military capability of Hezbollah - neither goal was accomplished. Hezbollah is leading the rebuilding effort in south Beirut and Lebanon using "unlimited" support from Iran, thereby awarding Hezbollah further political clout. However, given the response from Israeli military forces, which caused widespread destruction in southern Lebanon, as well as a new UN force to occupy what was formerly a Hezbollah controlled area, the conflict is generally seen as weakening Hezbollah militarily.[5][6][7]

Khairi Abaza wrote in the Lebanese English-language daily Daily Star: "The same strategic manipulation of public opinion can be seen in Hizbullah's 'victory' against Israel in summer 2006. But what was this victory? A victory that left around 1,200 Lebanese dead, led to billions of dollars in damages and losses in tourism income, and the entry of United Nations troops in Southern Lebanon? With such a balance sheet, how could Hizbullah and its Arab supporters mislead the Arab public and claim victory?... Yes, the party's secretary general, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, was left standing... but is that enough when their nations and people were left battered?"

A sign erected after the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon war in South Lebanon which displays rockets and Hezbollah Chief Nasrallah

On 27 August, Hassan Nasrallah apologised to the Lebanese people for the incident that sparked the war, saying "Had we known that the capture of the soldiers would have led to this, we would definitely not have done it." This was the day before UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's visit to Lebanon, On 22 September, some eight hundred thousand Hezbollah supporters gathered in Beirut for a victory rally. Nasrallah said that Hezbollah should celebrate the "divine and strategic victory".

Israeli Prime Minister Olmert admitted to the Knesset that there were mistakes in the war in Lebanon, though he framed UN Security Council resolution 1701 as an accomplishment for Israel that would bring home the seized soldiers, and said that the operations had altered the regional strategic balance vis-à-vis Hezbollah. Israeli chief of staff Dan Halutz admitted to failings in the conflict. On 15 August, Israeli government and defense officials called for Halutz' resignation following a stock scandal in which he admitted selling stocks hours before the start of the Israeli offensive. Halutz subsequently resigned 17 January 2007.[8]

On 21 August, a group of demobilized Israel reserve soldiers and parents of soldiers killed in the fighting started a movement calling for the resignation of Ehud Olmert and the establishment of a state commission of inquiry. They set up a protest tent opposite the Knesset and grew to over 2,000 supporters by 25 August, including the influential Movement for Quality Government. On 28 August, Olmert announced that there would be no independent state or governmental commission of inquiry, but two internal inspection probes, one to investigate the political echelon and one to examine IDF, and likely a third commission to examine the Home Front, to be announced at a later date. These would have a more limited mandate and less authority than a single inquiry commission headed by a retired judge. The political and military committees were to be headed by former director of Mossad Nahum Admoni and former Chief of Staff Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, respectively. Critics argued that these committees amount to a whitewash, due to their limited authority, limited investigatory scope, their self-appointed basis, and that neither would be headed by a retired judge.

Due to these pressures, on 11 October, Admoni was replaced by retired justice Eliyahu Winograd as chair of the political probe, and the probe itself was elevated to the status of governmental commission with near-state commission mandate: the Winograd Commission. On 12 September, former defense minister Moshe Arens spoke of "the defeat of Israel" in calling for a state committee of inquiry. He said that Israel had lost "to a very small group of people, 5000 Hezbollah fighters, which should have been no match at all for the IDF," and stated that the conflict could have "some very fateful consequences for the future." Disclosing his intent to shortly resign, Ilan Harari, the IDF's chief education officer, stated at a conference of senior IDF officers that Israel lost the war, becoming the first senior active duty officer to publicly state such an opinion. IDF Major General Yiftah Ron Tal, on 4 October 2006 became the second and highest ranking serving officer to express his opinion that the IDF failed "to win the day in the battle against Hezbollah," as well as calling for Lt. Gen. Dan Halutz' resignation. Ron-Tal was subsequently fired for making those and other critical comments. Hezbollah was quick to use the findings of the report to bolster its claims of victory over the vastly superior Israeli military and to criticize the Lebanese government's handling of the conflict.

In March 2007, the Israeli Ministerial Committee for Symbols and Ceremonies decided that the conflict would be defined as a war, following pressure from bereaved families. Two days later, the Committee decided to name the war "The Second Lebanon War", a decision that was subsequently approved by the Israeli cabinet.

In Syria the war has led to a more belligerent policy towards Israel. In late 2006 President Bashar al-Assad threatened to strike Israel if it did not withdraw from the Golan, saying "even your atomic bomb will not protect you."

U.S. President George W. Bush questioned Hezbollah's declarations of victory "when at one time [they] were a state within a state, safe within southern Lebanon, and now [they're] going to be replaced by a Lebanese army and an international force." UNIFIL has been given an expanded mandate, including the ability to use force to ensure that their area of operations is not used for hostile activities, and to resist attempts by force to prevent them from discharging their duties. However by April 2007, the Bush administration had re-characterized Israel’s experience in the war. They described the Summer War as a “strategic defeat” that failed to meet military goals, heaped widespread condemnation upon it, and punctured the “myth of the invincibility of the Israeli army.” The fighting resulted in a huge financial setback for Lebanon, with estimates ranging from US$7 to US$15 billion in direct costs while the cost for Israel is put at US$1.6 - US$3 billion. This has prompted a commentator in the London-based Arabic newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat to question the claims of victory by Hezbollah. According to one analyst in the Associated Press, the main casualty was the fragile unity between Lebanon's sectarian and political groups, though an Asia Times piece points to Free Patriotic Movement head Michel Aoun's support for Hezbollah and provision of housing for displaced Shi'a as evidence for strengthened relations.

Lebanese desire to emigrate has increased since the war. Over a fifth of Shias, a quarter of Sunnis, and nearly half of Maronites have expressed the desire to leave Lebanon. Nearly a third of such Maronites have already submitted visa applications to foreign embassies, and another 60,000 Christians have already fled, as of April 2007. Lebanese Christians are concerned that their influence is waning, fear the apparent rise of radical Islam, and worry of potential Sunni-Shia rivalry.